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I. INTRODUCTION
"Change is good. Change is a necessary part of life. Change
refreshes and challenges. We all welcome change. Like hell.
Most of us hate change."'
Most of us hate change, yet even the most naive recognize that changes
regarding our civil liberties are inevitable following the terrorist attacks of Sep-
tember 11, 2001. Following the attacks of September 11 th, news commentators
throughout the United States were not inquiring into whether our civil liberties
would be diminished, but rather, the ways the American public would have to
barter civil liberties for safety. For example, an article published in U.S. News
and World Report shortly after the attacks stated that "[b]efore September 11,
government agencies and industry approached high-tech security devices warily,
wondering whether the benefits outweighed the civil liberties and privacy con-
cers. Now the question they're asking isn't whether these devices should be
used but how soon they can be in place." 2 Another article in U.S. News and
World Report stated that, following the attacks of September 11 th, "[w]e all can
expect to be scanned, probed, and sniffed by new devices at airports and in pub-
lic buildings, gaining reassurance [of safety] at cost in dollars, convenience, and
personal privacy."3 An article published in Business Week shortly after the at-
tacks reported,
Journalists, civil libertarians, and other professional
alarmists cry "Big Brother" too frequently. But none of the pri-
vacy controversies of recent years - indeed, no event in modem
history - has brought the prospect of Big Brother closer to real-
ity than the World Trade Center horror. The thought that the
same attackers might have access to biological weapons and
other advanced technology forces us to reach for an equally
powerful and futuristic arsenal with which to strike back. Sud-
denly, proposals are gaining legitimacy that were all but unmen-
I Roger Simon, The New Normal, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Nov. 12, 2001, at 14, 16.
2 Dana Hawkins, Guarding Liberties as Well as Lives, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Oct. 8,
2001, at 56, 57.
3 Dana Hawkins & David LaGesse, Tech vs. Terrorists, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Oct. 8,
2001, at 56, 57.
[Vol. 105
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 105, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol105/iss1/9
2002] REEVALUATING THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY 251
tionable a month ago. Calls are being made for the establish-
ment of databases of information about what citizens look like,
where they go, and what they do; for the use of surveillance
technology to monitor the nation's e-mail traffic; and for the
imposition of a national identification card, to name a few.
4Many of these steps may well be necessary.
An article in the National Journal reported that, after the events of Sep-
tember 11, "[p]rivacy will shrink. Boarding an airliner will be more like board-
ing El Al Israel: passenger-by-passenger interrogations; intrusive luggage and,
sometimes, body searches; long delays; armed guards, armed sky marshals,
maybe even armed flight attendants or pilots."'5 Regarding the effects of the
September 11 attacks on the use of weapon scanning technology, a reporter for
the Evening Standard noted that "[t]he fact that [QinetiQ's thermal-imaging
device, a weapon scanner currently employed as an alternative to a manual frisk
in some airports,] strips its target so people appear almost naked has caused con-
cern among civil rights watchers. But - with the events [of September 1 lth] in
New York - such concerns may no longer seem so important.',
6
Most of us hate change, but despite the unease associated with bartering
civil liberties for safety, we must each, individually and collectively as citizens
of the United States, consider the civil liberties we are willing to forego to live
in a society where daily decisions are not dictated by terrorists abroad. As noted
by Erwin Chemerinsky, "It is so important for the debate to get past the point
where one side is saying, 'We've got to give up civil liberties,' and the other
side is saying, 'We cannot give up civil liberties.. . .' It has to be a much more
nuanced discussion of what civil liberties are being compromised, under which
circumstances, and for what gain.",7 Most of us hate change, yet change is com-
ing, "[slo amid vigilant new security and surveillance, we must work with con-
summate care to limit the damage to our freedoms.
With regard to civil liberties, many of the darkest moments in the his-
tory of the United States have fallen on the heels of military threats to American
soil. Basic criminal rights were suspended for soldiers during the Civil War.9
During World War I, free expression was sharply curtailed by the Espionage
4 Mike France & Heather Green, Security vs. Civil Liberties, Bus. WK., Oct. 1, 2001, at 50,
50.
5 Stuart Taylor, Jr., Thinking the Unthinkable: Next Time Could Be Much Worse, 37 NAT'L J.
2801, 2805 (2001).
6 Peter Almond, New Weapon Sees Through Terrorists, EVENING STANDARD (London),
Sept.18, 2001, at 17.
7 France & Green, supra note 4, at 50.
8 Taylor, supra note 5, at 2806.
9 France & Green, supra note 4, at 50.
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and Sedition Acts.° Few blots on the history of the United States are as dark as
that caused by the internment of Japanese Americans during World War 11.11
Dark moments can be justified if a dark today provides for a brighter tomorrow.
However, there is little evidence that these dark moments did much to improve
security within the United States.1 2 Although news reports following the Sep-
tember 11 th attacks are replete with references indicating the American people
are prepared to accept reasonable reductions in civil liberties for concomitant
gains in personal security, "we must combine pervasive surveillance with vigi-
lant protection of privacy . ,13 All reductions in civil liberties must be justi-
fied by equal gains in personal security. The dark day of September 11 th should
not be made darker by unjustified reductions in civil liberties.
The fight against terrorism probably will be fought on many fronts, in-
cluding changes in the enforcement of immigration laws, the enactment of new
legislation expanding the wiretap capability of the federal government in terror-
ist investigations, and the development of biosensors capable of detecting bio-
logical weapons. 14 However, one specific area where technological advance-
ments have a manifest potential to increase personal security and reduce civil
liberties is the development and deployment of sensory-enhancing electronic
surveillance weapon detection devices; these newly created weapons scanners
are the next generation of weapon detection technology. 15
Weapon detection systems can be classified into one of four categories
based on the level of resolution (i.e., the system's ability to detect weapons and
to discriminate weapons from other, non-contraband items) provided by the
system and the level of the intrusiveness of the scan (i.e., the intimacy of details
revealed about the person scanned). The four categories are derived from the
dichotomous coupling of these two factors: low resolution, low intrusiveness
(LRLI, e.g., security cameras); low resolution, high intrusiveness ("LRHI"; not
10 Id. at 51.
H See id.
12 See id.
13 Taylor, supra note 5, at 2806.
14 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C.S. § 1379 (2002) (requiring the "Attorney General and Secretary of State
to ... develop and certify a technology standard, including appropriate biometric identifier stan-
dards, that can be used to verify the identity of persons applying for a United States visa or such
persons seeking to enter the United States pursuant to a visa for the purposes of conducting back-
ground checks, confirming identity, and ensuring that a person has not received a visa under a
different name."); 8 U.S.C.S. § 1534 (2002) (noting that "an alien subject to removal under this
title [8 U.S.C.S. §§ 1531 et seq.] shall not be entitled to suppress evidence [collected through
electronic surveillance] that the alien alleges was unlawfully obtained."); Charles W. Petit, Catch-
ing a Whiff of Pestilence, U.S. NEws AND WORLD REP., Nov. 12, 2001, at 66 (discussing the de-
ployment of "small, automated biosensor devices [in] . .. malls, airports, post offices, and sub-
ways" to detect toxins, virus and dangerous microbes in the air).
15 See Jason Lazarus, Note, Vision Impossible? Imaging Devices-The New Police Technology
and the Fourth Amendment, 48 FLA. L. REv. 299 (1996).
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developed);' 6 high resolution, low intrusiveness ("HRLI"; not developed, but,
would be analogous with "canine sniff' drug detection systems); 17 and high
resolution, high intrusiveness ("HRHI"; e.g., BodySearch low dose X-ray
imager, Millivision millimeter wave imager, and manual frisk).
In examining the evolution of weapon detection technology, Fox
Butterfield noted that "new weapons detectors are expected to raise novel con-
stitutional questions about police searches, and there are no exact precedents for
the answers.' 18 This note attempts to address some of these constitutional ques-
tions. Specifically, this note discusses the circumstances where it would be ap-
propriate to employ weapons detection systems in three of these categories, the
level of suspicion required by the security agency before use of each of these
systems, and how the utility of each system broadens or narrows depending on
circumstances, such as the location of the scan and the nature of the suspected
criminal activity (e.g., drug trafficking vs. terrorism).
II. DEVELOPING AND CATEGORIZING CONCEALED WEAPON DETECTION
SYSTEMS
A. Concealed Weapon Detection Systems Currently Under Development
Because of a perceived need to create new sources of revenue for de-
fense technology companies following the end of the Cold War, beginning in
the mid-1990's, the federal government intensified federal funding of projects
developing concealed weapon detection systems. 19 The Department of Defense
joined with the Department of Justice to transfer military technology used by the
Department of Defense to the commercial market so that commercial products
could be manufactured using this technology. 20 The goal was to make military
technology available to local law enforcement agencies.
16 Systems in this category represent the "worst of both worlds." They provide little informa-
tion and are highly intrusive. Because low resolution, minimally intrusive systems and high reso-
lution, moderately intrusive systems are available, no further consideration is given to weapon
detection systems in this category.
17 A weapon detection system in this category would be analogous to a canine sniff search for
narcotics. Raytheon Corporation's electromagnetic pulse weapon detection systems detect only
metallic weapons with recognized magnetic signatures. Despite these limits in their resolution,
electromagnetic pulse weapon detection systems offer a relatively high level of resolution with
minimal intrusiveness. Raytheon's electromagnetic pulse weapon detection systems demonstrate
the attributes of future weapon detection systems in this category. See Erik Milstone, New De-
vices Let Frisks Go Undercover, 82 A.B.A. J. 32; Fox Butterfield, Justice Dept. Awarding Grants
to Develop Gun Detectors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1995, at Cl.
18 Fox Butterfield, New Devices May Let Police Spot People on the Street Hiding Guns, N.Y.
TiMES, Apr. 7, 1997, at Al.
19 Laura B. Riley, Comment, Concealed Weapon Detectors and the Fourth Amendment: The
Constitutionality of Remote Sense-Enhanced Searches, 45 UCLA L. REv. 281, 285 (1997).
20 Id.
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In 1993, Janet Reno formally launched the transfer of military technol-
ogy to law enforcement when she asked the Secretary of Defense to "assist the
Department of Justice in 'identifying and transferring military technologies use-
ful to law enforcement.' ' 21 The Law Enforcement Technology Advisory Coun-
cil noted that its top priority was the development of three concealed weapon
detection systems including "one capable of being placed unobtrusively in
school entrances; One [sic] capable of being mounted in and operated from a
vehicle; and a handheld or portable version .... ,,22 Based on recommendations
from the Law Enforcement Technology Advisory Council, the National Institute
of Justice began awarding research grants to organizations and companies his-
torically involved in defense development including "Raytheon Corporation of
Portsmouth, Rhode Island, Millimetrix Corporation of Hadley, Massachusetts,
and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, a branch of the Department of En-
ergy."
23
Weapon detection systems currently under development include passive
millimeter wave cameras, electromagnetic portals employing fluxgate magne-
tometers, tetahertz-wave weapons imagers, wide-band radar weapons detectors,
combined millimeter wave/infrared cameras, and acoustic concealed weapon
detectors. 24 An overview of current concealed weapon detection development
supported by the United States Department of Justice can be viewed on the Na-
tional Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center website.
25
B. Categorizing Weapon Detection Systems
Many law review articles address the intrusion of specific weapon de-
tection systems on reasonable expectations of privacy.26 Following the devel-
opment of, or litigation over, the use of each new police surveillance technol-
ogy, a plethora of legal diatribes have been published consisting of post hoc
analyses of the intrusiveness of the newly developed surveillance technology
and the resulting benefits in crime reduction or increased personal security. For
21 Id.
22 Law Enforcement Technology, 1995: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 30 (1995) (statement of David G. Boyd, Director, Science &
Technology Division of the National Institute of Justice); David C. Morrison, Crime-Fighting
2001, 26 GOV'T EXECUTIVE 42, 43 (1994).
23 Riley, supra note 19, at 286.
24 See The National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center's Website,
http://www.nlect.org/ for more information about these weapon detection systems.
25 The National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center is a program within the
United States Department of Justice. The address for the developing technology section of the
National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center's website is
http://www.nlect.org/techproj/.
26 See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 15; Riley, supra note 19.
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example, post hoc analyses of specific surveillance technologies have followed
the development of wire taps,27 electronic bugging devices, spike mikes,29 ca-
nine "sniffs, 30 high resolution aerial photography, 31 and forward-looking infra-
red radar. 32 Because of standing requirements, courts may analyze the use of
these systems only on a post hoc basis where a case or controversy exists.
33
Many weapon detection systems currently under development may not
pass constitutional muster if used in ways currently intended. Resources should
be diverted away from the development of weapon detection systems that, based
on case precedent, will likely be adjudged to violate the Fourth Amendment.
The development of weapon detection systems should be guided by
categorizing developmental and hypothetical systems based on each system's
intrusiveness and resolution. Weapon detection systems can be placed in one of
four categories based on the dichotomous coupling of intrusiveness and resolu-
tion: LRLI, HRLI, LRHI, and HRHI.34 The usefulness and the constitutionally
permissible uses of detection systems can be broadly defined for each category.
For example, no probable cause would be required to use weapon detection sys-
tems in the high resolution, low intrusiveness (not developed) or the low resolu-
tion, low intrusiveness (e.g., security cameras) categories.35 However, although
use of systems in both categories would be constitutionally permissible without
probable cause, 36 HRLI systems would be more useful than systems in the latter
category. In addition, although systems in the HRHI and the HRLI categories
would be equally capable of detecting contraband, probable cause would be
necessary only for the use of HI systems.
We can achieve three goals through categorizing detection systems
based on resolution and intrusiveness. First, through categorizing detection sys-
tems, we can determine the specific circumstances under which each develop-
mental system could be employed, as well as the level of suspicion needed to
use detectors in each category. Second, categorizing detection systems allows
27 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
28 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
29 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
30 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
31 Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
32 United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir.
1996) (en banc).
33 See U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 2; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
34 See Part I.; supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
35 A HRLI weapon detection system would be analogous to a "canine sniff." Like a "canine
sniff," the weapon detection system would only detect the presence of contraband (i.e., illegal
weapons). Because HRLI systems would alert police only to the presence of contraband, use of
the system would not invade constitutionally protected privacy interests.
36 See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
7
Menzel: Terrorism and Weapons Detection Technology: Reevaluating the Reas
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2002
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
developers to determine the value or usefulness of each detection system in its
constitutionally permissible roles. Most importantly, categorizing weapon de-
tection systems based on intrusiveness and resolution allows for proactive
analyses of the utility and constitutionality of hypothetical, undeveloped detec-
tion systems. Consideration of hypothetical detection systems can direct the
development of less intrusive, higher resolution detection systems. In addition,
consideration of the weapon detection systems in terms of resolution, which is
directly related to the usefulness of the system in increasing personal security,
and intrusiveness, which is directly related to how far the system evades our
privacy rights, places the "give and take" nature associated with increasing per-
sonal security while protecting civil liberties in a more acute perspective.
We must assume that the reason HRLI weapon detection systems have
not been developed is because the technology necessary to develop these sys-
tems does not currently exist. The events of September 11 th suggest an imme-
diate need for improved security. In toppling the World Trade Center Towers
and ripping through the Pentagon, the attacks of September 1 lth destroyed more
than buildings and crushed more than life; the attacks forever altered the pre-
September lth balance struck between personal security and civil liberties.
Because non-intrusive weapon detectors capable of detecting plastic knives and
other weapons used by terrorist in the September 1 lth do not exist, the courts
and American people face the onerous task of re-balancing our immediate need
for increased personal security and the privacy we are willing to exchange for
this security.
C. Illustrating the Effect of Resolution and Intrusion on Classifying
Surveillance Technology
The United States Supreme Court's analysis in Place illustrates two im-
portant factors to be considered when classifying police surveillance technol-
ogy: the intrusiveness and resolution of the search. Although Place involved
police surveillance for narcotics, not weapons, the holding of the case indicates
the most important factors to consider when determining the reasonableness of a
police surveillance method.38
Although intrusiveness and resolution are related, analysis of both is
necessary when evaluating the utility and danger imposed by a weapon scanner.
In Place, the police, responding to a tip that Place might be involved in drug
trafficking, stopped him in an airport. The police subjected Place's luggage to a
sniff search by a drug-sniffing dog. After the dog reacted positively to the lug-
37 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
38 Id. at 705-07 (noting that "[t]he intrusion on possessory interests occasioned by a seizure of
one's personal effects can vary both in its nature and extent," and holding that "the canine sniff is
sui generis" because it is "so limited both in the manner in which the information is obtained and
in the content of the information revealed") (emphasis added).
[Vol. 105
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gage, the police conducted a full search of it and discovered cocaine. 39 Because
scanning Place's luggage with the canine nose did not require opening the lug-
gage or viewing its contents, and because the scan alerted the police to the de-
tection of only contraband, the level of the intrusiveness of the scan was low. In
addition to being minimally intrusive, because the scan had a high probability of
detecting drugs if drugs were present, and because the scan detected the pres-
ence of only contraband, the resolution of the scan was high. Because the "ca-
nine sniff' is minimally intrusive and only detects the presence of illegal contra-
band, the Court held that this type of scan was not a search under the Fourth
Amendment4 °
The Court's holding in Place illustrates, through analogy, that future de-
tection systems will pass constitutional muster for use in almost unlimited cir-
cumstances so long as the detection system only detects the presence of contra-
band.4' Weapon scanners with the properties of the canine sniff do not currently
exist. Because of our need for improved weapon detection systems following
the terrorist attacks of September 11 th, we must consider the intrusiveness and
resolution of existing and developmental weapon scanners, and the circum-
stances under which these systems may currently be employed.
HI. THE EVOLUTION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH AND SEIZURE
DOCTRINE
A. The Birth of the Fourth Amendment
John Adams, in discussing the fervor surrounding the American Revolu-
tion, noted that the "child Independence" was born out of concern over writs of
assistance and the unlimited authority these writs gave English soldiers to enter
American homes and businesses to search for smuggled goods.4 2 One of the
primary catalysts for the American Revolution was the use, by English solders,
of general warrants to search homes without a prior showing of probable cause
or reasonable suspicion. 43 With this oppression fresh in the minds of the draft-
ers of the U.S. Constitution, the Fourth Amendment was written "to prevent the
use of governmental force to search a man's house, his person, his papers, and
his effects; and to prevent their seizure against his will." 44 The Fourth Amend-
39 Id. at 698-99.
40 Id. at 707.
41 See id.; see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(noting that "sense-enhancing equipment that identifies nothing but illegal activity is not a
search").
42 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886).
43 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463 (1928); see also Osmond K. Fraenkel,
Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARV. L. REV. 361, 362-63 (1920).
44 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 463.
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ment provides that "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated. ''45 The language of the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all
searches - "only unreasonable searches and seizures... are forbidden. 4 6 The
text of the Fourth Amendment does not define what constitutes a search and
what makes a search reasonable. The power of the Fourth Amendment hangs on
the definition of "search" and "reasonable." Courts continue to struggle with
the definition of these two terms, and their meanings are ever evolving.
B. Pre-Katz Property Based Approach
Early jurisprudence utilized a property-based approach when analyzing
Fourth Amendment search issues. Under this trespass doctrine, the Fourth
Amendment was not violated unless there had been a warrantless search of a
person's "tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion of his house
'or curtilage. ' ' '47 In Olmstead v. United States, the Court noted that the Fourth
Amendment only applied to "material things" or physical invasion of the
home.48 Because of the primitive nature of police surveillance technology prior
to the twentieth century, this narrow interpretation of the Fourth Amendment
was sufficient to shield citizens from most unwarranted governmental searches.
However, by the mid-1900's, courts were beginning to comment on potential
conflicts between technological advancements in police surveillance and this
narrow interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. 49 Use of the property-based
trespass doctrine to analyze Fourth Amendment search issues permitted the po-
lice to use wiretaps5° or electronic bugs51 without probable cause. The Court in
Berger v. New York52 noted that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was not
keeping "pace with ... advances in scientific knowledge. 53
45 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
46 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 641 (Miller, J., concurring).
47 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
48 Id. at 464.
49 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
50 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
51 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
52 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
53 Id. at 49.
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C. The Impact of Katz and Katz Progeny
1. Katz v. United States
The era of using a property-based approach in analyzing Fourth
Amendment search issues came to a close with the Court's decision in Katz v.
United States.54 The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") suspected that
Katz was using a public phone booth to conduct illegal wagering activity. The
FBI attached an electronic listening device to the outside of a phone booth to
monitor the content of calls Katz made from the booth. Even though the phone
booth was a public area and the thing searched (i.e., the content of Katz' phone
conversations) was not a tangible material effect, the Court held that monitoring
phone conversations was a search.55 In broadening its definition of search, the
Court expressly overruled Olmstead and Goldman v. United States56 with re-
spect to their reliance on the property-based trespass doctrine. The rule that
emanated from Katz is that the Fourth Amendment protects privacy interests,
even outside the home, so long as the privacy interest passes a two-part test.57
The first prong of the two-part test is the subjective prong; the person searched
must exhibit an actual expectation of privacy. 58 The second, objective prong
requires that the expectation of privacy be one society is willing to recognize as
reasonable. 59 In applying this two-part test, Justice Harlan, in a concurring opin-
ion, noted that Katz exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy when he en-
tered the phone booth and shut the door behind him before placing his call and
that "expectations of freedom from intrusion [when placing calls from phone
booths] are recognized as reasonable." 6 Because the Court found that Katz
exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy when placing his call from the
phone booth and that his expectation of privacy was one the public recognized
as reasonable, the Court held that monitoring the phone call was a search under
the Fourth Amendment. 61 Katz marked the supplanting of the trespass doctrine
with the two-prong, subjective expectation/objective reasonableness test for
analyzing issues involving searches and the Fourth Amendment.
54 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
55 Id. at 353.
56 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
57 Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (Harlan, J., concurring) (articulating two-part test).
58 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
59 Id.
60 Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
61 Id.
11
Menzel: Terrorism and Weapons Detection Technology: Reevaluating the Reas
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2002
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
2. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States
In its holding in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,62 the Court added
an additional factor, "intimate details," to be considered when determining what
sorts of activities constitute a search. The Court's holding in Dow suggests that
as the intimacy of details revealed by the scan increases, the Court is more likely
to hold that the expectation of privacy is one society considers reasonable.63
The holding in Dow indicates the Court would consider use of high-resolution
weapon detection systems currently available (e.g., passive millimeter wave and
low-dose X-ray imagers) a search under the Fourth Amendment.
In Dow, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") took aerial pho-
tographs of a Dow chemical plant. Dow sought to have evidence revealed in the
photographs excluded from trial because it alleged the aerial photography con-
stituted an illegal search. The Court disagreed and held that because the EPA
used a "conventional ... commercial camera" rather than "some unique sensory
device that.., could penetrate ... walls," the aerial photography did not consti-
tute a constitutionally proscribed search.64
In determining if the aerial photography constituted an impermissible
search, the Court looked at two factors: the availability of the surveillance
equipment to the general public and the intimacy of the details revealed by the
search. 65  Because the technology used in high-resolution weapon detectors
(e.g., passive millimeter or low-dose X-ray imaging) is not available to the gen-
eral public, the Court is more likely to find that the use of these systems consti-
tutes a search. 66 In addition, the intimacy of detail revealed by high-resolution
weapon detectors such as the BodySearch low dose X-ray imager and Millivi-
sion millimeter wave imager indicates the Court would find that a person's ex-
pectation of privacy in the details revealed by these scans is reasonable and,
therefore, that use of these systems constitutes a search under the Katz test.
62 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986).
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 237-38.
66 It is possible to "see through a person's clothing with such accuracy that it can scan some-
one standing on the street and detect the diameter of a woman's nipples, or whether a man has
been circumcised." Judy Jones, Look Ahead to the Year 2000: Electronic Arm Of The Law Is
Getting More High-Tech, COURIER-J. (Louisville, KY), Oct. 19, 1999, available at LEXIS, News
Library, COUJNL File. "Imaging devices might be capable of viewing extremely personal items
such as a prosthetic limb, a woman's sanitary napkin, a colostomy bag, or more unusual items."
Lazarus, supra note 15, at 311.
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3. Kyllo v. United States
Many weapon detection systems currently in use or being developed
rely on monitoring the amount and spatial patterns of radiation emitted from a
person's body.67 In Kyllo v. United States,6 the government further argued that
because its use of a thermal imaging device only detected "waste heat" emitted
from the suspect's home and did not reveal intimate details about activities
within the house, use of the thermal imager was not a search. The government
argued that, like garbage left on the curb,6 9 a person could not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in heat vented from the home. Because many weapon
detection systems currently in development rely on monitoring "waste radia-
tion" emitted from the suspect's body, an analogous argument could be made
that because people do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in "waste
radiation" emitted from their body, use of scanning technology that monitors the
amount and spatial patterns of radiation emitted from a body does not constitute
a search. The Court's holding in Kyllo suggests this argument would fail.
In Kyllo, government agents used an Agema Thermovision 210 thermal
imager to monitor the amount of infrared radiation emitted from one unit of a
triplex where police suspected the tenant was using high-intensity lamps to grow
marijuana. 70 The types of halide lamps used to grow marijuana indoors produce
large amounts of heat that either escapes or is intentionally vented outside the
home. When an object is scanned with a thermal imager, the relative levels of
heat emitted from different portions of the object can be detected from the dif-
ferent shades of white, gray, and black produced on the scanner screen; white
objects are hot, black are cool, and gray represents a temperature gradient be-
tween the two extremes. 71 The type of thermal scanner employed in Kyllo de-
tected only heat emitted from the triplex and did not reveal intimate details of
activities taking place within the home.72 However, the Court held that "obtain-
67 "All objects with temperatures above absolute zero naturally emit a broad spectrum of elec-
tromagnetic radiation, the details of which are determined by the material and the surface proper-
ties of the object, as characterized by its emissivity, and by its temperature. The apparent bright-
ness of the object as viewed by a passive millimeter wave imager is a product of its physical tem-
perature times its emissivity. A person at millimeter wavelengths is an especially good emitter.
Metal objects are very poor emitters. Dielectric objects, such as plastics, ceramics, plastic explo-
sives, powdered drugs, etc., have emission properties that are in between flesh and metals. Cloth-
ing is virtually transparent." Reducing Gun Violence, 1994: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 1 (1994) [hereinafter Gun Violence
Hearings] (statement of G. Richard Huguenin, President, Millitech [now Millimetrix] corpora-
tion), available at LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File.
68 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
69 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
70 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29.
71 Id. at 29-30.
72 The thermal imager used in Kyllo "did not expose any intimate details of Kyllo's life," only
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ing by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the home's inte-
rior that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical 'intrusion into
a constitutionally protected area' constitutes a search ....
The Court probably will use the same analytical framework used in
Kyllo when analyzing the circumstances under which weapon detection systems
that detect the presence of weapons by monitoring "waste emissions" produced
by the body can be employed. The "waste radiation" and "waste sonic vibra-
tion" arguments with regard to weapons detectors are analogous to the "waste
heat" argument made in Kyllo, which the Court made clear could not be recon-
ciled with the holding in Katz.74 Because the "waste emissions" detected by
passive millimeter weapon detectors are so closely analogous to the "waste
heat" monitored in Kyllo, and because people have similar reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy in their home and the intimate details of their bodies, it is
unlikely the Court would find the "waste radiation" argument persuasive. In
addition, unlike the thermal scanner employed in Kyllo, weapon detectors such
as passive millimeter wave cameras reveal private, intimate details about the
individual scanned.75 In Dow, the Court noted that the intimacy of the details
revealed is a factor to consider when determining if the use of the technology
constitutes a permissible search.76
The Kyllo Court indicated that one factor it relied on in determining that
the thermal scan was a search was the potential for the sense-enhancing tech-
nology to reveal intimate details.7 7 Because of the intimate details revealed by
weapon detectors relying on "waste radiation" to produce an image of objects
hidden beneath a person's clothing, and because the waste-energy argument has
not previously prevailed, the Court will likely determine that the use of weapon
detectors that rely on monitoring "waste radiation" constitutes a search under
the Fourth Amendment.
4. The Current Rule
Despite the Kyllo decision, the holding in Katz remains the applicable
rule regarding what constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. The
Katz progeny helps illustrate factors the Court considers when determining (1) if
"amorphous 'hot spots' on the roof and exterior wall." United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041,
1047 (9th Cir. 1999). But see Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37 ("In the home, our cases show, all details are
intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.").
73 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 28
74 See id. at 34-36.
75 See supra note 65.
76 Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 237-38.
77 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38.
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the person searched exhibited an actual expectation of privacy, and (2) if this
expectation of privacy was one society was prepared to consider reasonable.78
The Court in Dow did not address the "intimacy of detail revealed" and
"availability of technology used" in terms of gradients. However, the holding in
Dow suggests that as the intimacy of the detail revealed increases, and the avail-
ability of the technology used decreases, the Court is more likely to determine
that the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the thing searched.
The Court's holding in Kyllo helps fill gaps in the Katz rule. If a person
voluntarily vents waste energy from her home, she has no subjective expectation
of privacy in her waste heat.79 However, if the sensory-enhancing technology
provides information about activities occurring inside the home that could not
otherwise have been obtained without physically entering the home, use of the
technology constitutes a search. 0
Although the holdings of Katz, Dow, and Kyllo indicate that the use of
all high-resolution weapon detection systems currently available constitutes a
search, the Fourth Amendment does not bar all searches; only unreasonable
searches are constitutionally prohibited. Issues courts are likely to face in the
near future include (1) the circumstances under which the use of weapon detec-
tion systems is permissible, (2) if the events of September 11, 2001 changed the
expectations of privacy society is willing to consider reasonable, and if so, (3)
under what circumstances is society willing to permit the government to use
weapon scanners without probable cause.
IV. WHEN THE USE OF CONCEALED WEAPON DETECTION SYSTEMS IS
CONSTITUTIONAL
The constitutionality of the use of concealed weapon-detector systems
depends on the circumstances under which each system is employed.81 Weapon
detectors could be employed in numerous circumstances including (1) situations
where the police have probable cause to search a suspect and use a weapons
scanner in place of a manual frisk, (2) Terry-stop situations where the police
have a reasonable articulable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous
and use a weapons scanner in place of a Terry-style patdown, and (3) in admin-
istrative-search situations, such as at airports and court houses, where the weap-
ons scanner is used in place of magnetometers.
A potential fourth category would include the use of weapons detectors
in non-administrative situations where police do not have probable cause to
search and do not have a reasonable articulable suspicion that the subject is
armed and dangerous. However, use of weapon scanners in these situations
78 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
79 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 27
80 Id.
81 Riley, supra note 19, at 281.
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would be constitutional only if scanning a subject with the scanner did not con-
stitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. Although manufacturers of some
weapon detectors suggest the detectors could be configured to work in a binary
fashion (i.e., where they detected only contraband), this technology is not cur-
rently available. 82 The Court most likely will find that use of all high-resolution
systems currently available constitutes a search and will not permit the unre-
stricted use of these detectors.
A. Use of Weapon Detection Systems When There Is Probable Cause to
Search
Although the Court has noted that "the police must, whenever practica-
ble, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the war-
rant procedure," it has also held that "on-the-spot observations of the officer on
the beat ... historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be,
subjected to the warrant procedure., 83 So long as it was not practicable to ob-
tain a warrant prior to a search, courts commonly uphold warrantless manual
frisks conducted by police officers who have probable cause to believe a crime
has been committed and the person searched committed it.84
Although courts commonly uphold warrantless manual frisks, the Su-
preme Court has noted that a manual frisk "is a serious intrusion upon the sanc-
tity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resent-
ment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly. ' 5 A manual frisk often involves
feeling "with sensitive fingers every portion of the prisoner's body" and thor-
oughly searching the person's "arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin
and area about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down to the feet. 86
Use of a highly-intrusive high-resolution weapons detector, like a pas-
sive millimeter scanner, should be permissible under circumstances where a
manual frisk ordinarily would be used.87 However, the indignity suffered by a
82 "[P]assive millimeter wave imagers do literally see through clothing .... In order to pro-
tect a person's right to privacy, the actual image of the person being observed need only be dis-
played to an operator if a suspicious object is detected by the internal image processing algo-
rithms, giving "Probable cause" for the operator to ascertain the potential threat from the detected
object. A person with no suspicious object(s) could be cleared automatically with no operator
intervention and without an image being displayed." Gun Violence Hearings, supra note 67, at 1
(statement of G. Richard Huguenin, President, Millitech [now Millimetrix] corporation).
83 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
84 See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 30, 40 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Bayless,
201 F.3d 116, 132 (2d Cir. 2000); Laveto v. Lapina, 258 F.3d 1156, 1164 (3d Cir. 2001); United
States v. Hopkins, 268 F.3d 222, 225-26 (4th Cir. 2001).
85 Terry, 392 U.S. at 17.
86 L. L. Priar & T. F. Martin, Searching and Disarming Criminals, 45 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
481 (1954).
87 Low-dose X-ray images capable of detecting objects beneath people's clothing are already
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suspect scanned with a high-resolution weapon detector is comparable to, or less
than, the indignity wrought by a manual frisk.88 The indignity suffered by a
suspect from having government agents view an image on which the outline of
his scrotal area can be seen is no greater than the indignity suffered when the
government agent has to "feel with sensitive fingers ... the groin and area about
the testicles. 89
Where probable cause to search a suspect exists, electronic frisks via
weapon detectors offer two advantages over manual frisks. As noted by Jeremy
Travis, past director of the National Institute of Justice, "of the situation[s] cops
face day in and day out, the greatest risk is approaching a subject who may be
armed." 9 The safety of the officer is greatly increased if the officer "know[s] in
advance whether the individual is armed."9' In addition to concerns regarding
whether the suspect is armed, police face other risks, such as "the danger of be-
ing punctured by a hypodermic needle during a manual 'patdown."' 92 One ad-
vantage of electronic frisks over manual patdowns is that electronic frisks allow
police to determine if a suspect is armed before approaching or making contact
with the individual. In addition, electronic frisks alert police to hidden dangers
such as hypodermic needles hidden in the suspect's hair or clothing so that these
items can be removed if it is necessary to take the suspect into custody.
Another advantage of electronic frisks is that they can be conducted un-
der less conspicuous circumstances than manual frisks. Manual frisks com-
monly involve having the suspect "stand[] helpless, perhaps facing a wall with
his hands raised., 93 As noted by the Terry Court, "it is simply fantastic" to ar-
gue that a manual frisk conducted under such circumstances is a "petty indig-
nity."94 Although police presence would be obvious to bystanders during an
electronic frisk, the suspect would not be forced to stand "spread eagle" against
a wall with his hands on his head during the procedure and neither the suspect
nor the police would have to suffer the dehumanizing humiliation associated
being used in place of manual frisks in some U.S. airports. Hawkins & LaGesse, supra note 3, at
56. "The BodySearch technology has already performed electronic strip-searches on nearly 800
international passengers arriving at eight U.S. airports in cities including New York and Washing-
ton. Customs inspectors let travelers deemed 'suspicious' choose between the scan and a pat
down." Id.
88 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
89 Priar & Martin, supra note 86, at 481.
90 Butterfield, supra note 18, at Al.
91 Id.
92 Max Glaskin, Detector Frisks from a Distance, SUNDAY TIMES, Feb. 26, 1995, at Features.
93 Terry, 392 U.S. at 17.
94 Id. at 16-17.
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with having a government agent "feel with sensitive fingers every portion of the
[suspect's] body. 95
The use of weapon detection systems could prove beneficial, both to
suspects and to police officers, in circumstances where manual frisks tradition-
ally would be employed. Because electronic frisks subject suspects to no
greater intrusion than manual frisks, reduce risks in one of the most dangerous
situations faced by police officers, and may reduce the indignity suffered by
suspects subjected to manual frisks in public surroundings, the Court probably
would permit the use of high-resolution weapon detectors in circumstances
where police have probable cause to search a suspect.
B. Use of Weapon Detection Systems When There Is an Articulable
Reasonable Suspicion the Suspect Is Engaged in a Crime of Violence or
Is Armed
I. Non-Terrorist Terry-Stop Situations
The Fourth Amendment is not a "monolith., 96 Since the Court's hold-
ing in Camara v. Municipal Court,97 it is clear that there are degrees of searches
and that the meaning of "probable cause" depends on the context of the search.
The Camara decision introduced a balancing approach to the Fourth Amend-
ment. Because the Camara Court defined probable cause in terms of "reason-
ableness," the Camara holding allowed certain types of searches on the basis of
less than probable cause.98
Following on the heels of Camara, the Court established a new category
of "seizures" and "searches" in Terry v. Ohio.99 In Terry, the Court held that a
police officer may briefly detain an individual "for purposes of investigating
possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an
arrest" so long as the officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion that the
individual is involved in criminal enterprise. 1°° Based on the "reasonableness
test" established in Camara, the Court held that it was reasonable for police to
briefly detain an individual and engage in something less than a complete sei-
zure based on suspicion that was less than "probable cause."''° The Court also
95 Priar & Martin, supra note 86, at 481.
96 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives On the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349,
388 (1974).
97 387 U.S. 523 (1967); JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 138
(2000).
98 DRESSLER, supra note 97, at 139.
99 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
10o Id. at 22.
101 id. at 21-22. 27.
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held that if the officer had an articulable reasonable suspicion that the individual
"presented a threat to the officer's safety while he was investigating his suspi-
cious behavior," he could engage in a search of the suspect "limited to that
which was necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm
the officer or others nearby."'' 0 2 During this search the officer may patdown the
outer clothing of the individual and may seize only items whose criminal nature
is apparent. 1°3  This limited detention and limited search were later termed
Terry-stop and Terry-frisk, respectively.
Terry-stops and Terry-frisks protect police officers during one of the
most dangerous situations they face.' °4 The dangers faced by police officers in
Terry-stop situations often are as great as those where officers have probable
cause to search a suspect. It is clear that electronic frisks offer the same advan-
tages in Terry-stop situations as in searches where officers have probable cause
to search or searches incident to arrest.
Although electronic frisks offer the same benefits to police in Terry-stop
situations as they do in searches where officers have probable cause to search,
the Court is unlikely to permit police to use highly intrusive high-resolution
weapon detectors as a substitute for Terry-frisks. Unlike manual frisks, Terry-
frisks are restricted to a light pat down of the suspect's outer clothing. The in-
trusiveness of being scanned by a weapons detector such as the Millivision pas-
sive wave imager would be much greater than the intrusiveness associated with
a Terry frisk.
In addition, a Terry-frisk is conducted for the purpose of finding weap-
ons the suspect may use to harm the officer or others in the area; a Terry-frisk
should not be used for the purpose of detecting contraband. 0 5 During a Terry-
frisk, the officer is allowed to confiscate contraband other than weapons (e.g.,
drugs) only if the criminal nature of the item is apparent during the light pat-
down of the suspect's outer clothing.' °6 Because contraband other than weapons
also may be detected with most highly intrusive high-resolution weapon detec-
tors, use of these systems during a Terry-stop would allow the police to detect
items that a typical Terry-frisk would not discover. 07 Police officers would face
102 Id.
103 See id. at 29.
104 Butterfield, supra note 18, at Al.
105 Terry, 392 U.S. at 26. The limited pat down "must be limited to that which is necessary for
the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby." Id. "The
sole justification of the search in the present situation is the protection of the police officer and
others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to
discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer." Id.
at 29.
106 This is the "plain-feel" exception. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
107 Contraband detectable with passive millimeter wave imaging includes "[d]ry powders
and/or liquids in plastic bags, vials, or other containers ... in centimeter or larger sized packages."
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much greater temptation to manufacture articulable reasonable suspicion that a
suspect was armed and dangerous if the police knew that they then could scan
the suspect with a system that would alert them to the presence of contraband
possessed by the suspect. The use of high-resolution weapon detectors in these
circumstances would likely lead to an increase in the number of pretextual
searches conducted by police.
Because high-resolution weapon detectors are more intrusive than
Terry-frisks, allowing their use in Terry-stop situations would expose suspects
to a greater than reasonable intrusion based only on an articulable reasonable
suspicion. In addition, because use of weapon detectors in Terry-stops would
likely lead to "fishing expeditions," permitting police to use weapon detectors in
Terry-stops probably would result in an increase in the number of people sub-
jected to Terry-frisks.
2. Terry-Stops Where Terrorist Activity Is Alleged: An Automatic
Terrorist Exception?
In Florida v. J.L.,° 8 the Court considered whether bald and unilluminat-
ing assertions from an anonymous caller that an individual was unlawfully car-
rying a concealed weapon justified a Terry-stop and frisk. Typically, uncor-
roborated anonymous tips do not justify a Terry-frisk. In J.L., the government
argued for an automatic firearm exception. Under this exception, police could
stop and frisk someone under the Terry rule, based on an uncorroborated
anonymous tip, if the informant suggested that the individual was illegally pos-
sessing a concealed firearm. In refusing to create an "automatic firearm excep-
tion" the court noted that "[flirearms are dangerous, and extraordinary dangers
sometimes justify unusual precautions," however, the Court held that "an auto-
matic firearm exception to [the] established reliability analysis would rove too
far."' °9 The Court suggested that creating "[sluch an exception would enable
any person seeking to harass another to set in motion an intrusive, embarrassing
police search of the targeted person simply by placing an anonymous call falsely
reporting the target's unlawful carriage of a gun."11 However, the Court went
on to state:
The facts of this case do not require us to speculate about the
circumstances under which the danger alleged in an anonymous
tip might be so great as to justify a search even without a show-
ing of reliability. We do not say, for example, that a report of a
Gun Violence Hearings, supra note 67, at 1 (statement of G. Richard Huguenin, President, Mil-
litech [now Millimetrix] corporation).
108 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
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person carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of reliability we
demand for a report of a person carrying a firearm before the
police can constitutionally conduct a frisk."'1
With these words, the Court in J.L. made it clear that while the level of
intrusiveness of a search should be commensurate with the reliability of the in-
formation indicating the individual was involved in criminal enterprise, the level
of suspicion required would be lower, and the required reliability of the infor-
mation leading to that suspicion would decrease, as the extraordinary nature of
the danger threatened increased. The Court's specific reference to bombs left its
path open to create an "automatic terrorist exception."
An automatic terrorist exception could be improperly used to the same
disastrous ends as an automatic firearm exception. However, because the rami-
fications of allowing terrorist activity to go unfettered so greatly outweighs the
dangers of allowing an individual to unlawfully possess a firearm, the Court
may hold that it is reasonable for police to conduct Terry-stops and frisks of
individuals suspected of terrorist activities based on information provided by
uncorroborated calls from anonymous informers.
In addition to permitting Terry-stops of suspected terrorists under cir-
cumstances where the reliability of an anonymous informer's tip would not be
sufficient to justify a Terry-stop of an individual involved in a non-terrorist
criminal enterprise, the automatic terrorist exception may also permit the Court
to allow more intrusive searches of individuals suspected of terrorist activity.
Interesting, in J.L. the Court stated that "extraordinary dangers sometimes jus-
tify unusual precautions."'" 2 With this statement, the Court made clear that the
Fourth Amendment is not a monolith," 3 that the protection provided by the
Fourth Amendment, and the amount of suspicion needed to justify a search un-
der the Fourth Amendment, exists on a gradient. Along this gradient, as the
level of intrusiveness of a search increases, the requisite level of suspicion
needed to justify a search also increases. Therefore, this statement suggests that
the sliding scale of reasonableness identified in Camara, and clarified in Terry,
also depends on the extraordinary nature of the danger threatened.
Based on the Court's reasoning pre-J.L., the level of suspicion, and
more importantly the reliability of the information upon which the suspicion is
based, needed to strip search an individual would be much greater than the level
of suspicion needed to pat down the individual's outer clothing. The Court's
reasoning in J.L. indicates that the level of suspicion needed to pat down the
outer clothing of an individual suspected of carrying a switchblade would be
greater than the level of suspicion needed to pat down the outer clothing of an
individual suspected of carrying a kilogram of C-4 plastic explosive (see Ap-
III Id. at 273-74 (emphasis added).
112 Id. at 272.
11 See Amsterdam, supra note 96, at 388.
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pendix, Figure IA). If, as it suggests in J.L., the Court is willing to alter the
level of suspicion required, or the reliability of information upon which this
information is based, in cases threatening "extraordinary dangers," data that is
moderately reliable should permit a more intrusive search to be conducted under
circumstances threatening "extraordinary dangers" than under less threatening
circumstances (see Appendix, Figure IB). This line of reasoning suggests that
although the Court should not permit the use of high-resolution weapon detec-
tors under "normal" Terry-stop circumstances where the individual is suspected
of being involved in non-terrorist criminal enterprise, because of the extraordi-
nary danger posed by individuals suspected of terrorist activity, electronic frisks
may be permitted in cases where there is evidence the individual is involved in
terrorist activity.
In addition to the extraordinary dangers posed by terrorists, more intru-
sive searches of individuals suspected of terrorist activity may be justified based
on the types of weapons commonly employed by terrorists. Whereas criminals
involved in non-terrorist activities commonly carry concealed firearms that can
be detected rather easily by magnetometers or patdowns of an individual's outer
clothing, terrorists involved in recent attacks in the United States have employed
box cutters, plastic knives," 4 and plastic explosives hidden in their shoes. 15
These types of weapons are difficult to detect with magnetometers or typical
Terry-style patdowns, but can be easily detected with the use of passive milli-
meter wave or low-dose X-ray imaging.'1 6 Passive millimeter wave imaging
can be used to detect "ceramic knives, low- or non-metal guns, non-metal gre-
nades, .. . plastic explosives, [and] electronic devices such as 'wires,' tape re-
corders, explosive timers, or remote detonators."' 17 Because of the "extraordi-
nary dangers" threatened by terrorist activity, and because the types of weapons
commonly employed by terrorists are difficult to detect in typical Terry-style
patdowns, the Court may create an "automatic terrorist exception" allowing
government agents to electronically frisk, during a Terry-stop, individuals sus-
pected of terrorist activity.
114 Washington Whispers, The Gun Angle, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Nov. 12, 2001, at
4.
115 Shoe-bomb Suspect Pleads Not Guilty to All 9 Charges, THE DESERET NEWS, Jan. 19, 2002,
at A02.
116 See Hawkins & LaGesse, supra note 3, at 56-57.
117 Gun Violence Hearings, supra note 67, at 1 (statement of G. Richard Huguenin, President,
Millitech [now Millimetrix] corporation).
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C. Use of Weapon Detection Systems Without Probable Cause or Reason-
able Suspicion
1. Non-Administrative Searches: "Street Searches"
A primary concern surrounding the development of weapon scanning
technology is that once the police have hand-held or vehicle mounted weapon
detection systems, they will begin routinely scanning people walking along
sidewalks, window shopping, or strolling in the local park, and that this scan-
ning will be conducted without probable cause or a reasonable articulable suspi-
cion that the individuals scanned have been involved in any sort of criminal
enterprise. David A. Harris, a professor of law at the University of Toledo Col-
lege of Law, noted that once hand-held weapon detectors are developed,
"[n]othing is going to stop the police from scanning everybody."' 1 8 According
to Max Glaskin of the Sunday Times, the development of portable weapon de-
tection systems means that "anyone, anywhere can be 'frisked' unknowingly,
either by a fixed machine or one held by hand."" 9 Reports from one of the de-
velopers of high-resolution weapon detection systems, G. Richard Huguenin,
President of Millitech Corporation, do little to lessen these concerns. In his
statement before a House of Representatives subcommittee, Mr. Huguenin
commented that passive millimeter wave imaging offers the advantage of re-
mote frisking suspects when a patrolman "does not wish to heighten tensions by
having direct physical contact with a suspect."'' 20  After reviewing these re-
marks, Mark Glaskin observed that police could further reduce potential tension
and make their job safer by scanning suspects from "an unseen vantage
point.'1 2' The potential for abuse is obvious.
The Court's analysis in United States v. Place'22 illustrates when, in
non-administrative settings, weapon detection systems could be used without
probable cause or reasonable articulable suspicion. The Court's holding in Place
illustrates the characteristics of the ultimate concealed weapon detection sys-
tem.
23
In Place, the police responded to an anonymous tip that Place might be
involved in drug trafficking. The police stopped Place at an airport and sub-
jected his luggage to a "sniff search" by a drug-sniffing dog. The dog reacted
118 Milstone, supra note 17, at 32.
119 Glaskin, supra note 92, at Features.
120 Gun Violence Hearings, supra note 67, at 1 (statement of G. Richard Huguenin, President,
Millitech [now Millimetrix] Corporation).
121 Glaskin, supra note 92, at Features.
122 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
123 The hypothetical ultimate concealed weapon detection system would be a high resolution-
low intrusiveness system that, like the canine sniff, detects only contraband. Such a system does
not currently exist.
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positively to Place's luggage, giving the police probable cause to conduct a
thorough search of the bag. During the search, the police discovered cocaine.
Place argued that the cocaine the police discovered in his luggage was
the fruit of an illegal search and should be excluded as evidence because the
police subjected his luggage to the "canine sniff' without probable cause. 124
The court rejected Place's argument.
Although the police did not have probable cause to search Place when
his luggage was subjected to the canine sniff, the cocaine the police discovered
in his luggage did not have to be excluded because the canine sniff did not con-
stitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. The Court noted that the canine
sniff "does not require opening the luggage" 125 scanned by the dog, and the dog
only responds to the presence of contraband. Because the canine sniff does not
"expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public
view,. . . the manner in which information is obtained [with the canine sniff] is
much less intrusive than a typical search."' 126 The Court held that because of the
minimal intrusiveness of the canine sniff and because the canine sniff reveals
the presence only of contraband, use of the canine sniff to detect narcotics in
luggage does "not constitute a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.,
127
Through analogy, Place suggests that, even without probable cause to
suspect a person is carrying a concealed weapon or reasonable articulable suspi-
cion that the individual is armed and dangerous, it would be constitutionally
permissible to scan the person with a weapon detection system that only ex-
posed the presence of illegal weapons. Because the detection system would
reveal the presence of contraband only, being scanned by the system would not
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. 28 Therefore, because the scan
would not constitute a search, concealed weapons detected by the system would
not be excluded as fruits of an illegal search.
An important factor to consider when analogizing the canine sniff to
weapon detection systems is that, unlike concealed weapons, the legality of
most "street drugs" is relatively uniform among states.129 For example, the pos-
session of cocaine is illegal in all fifty states. The use of a drug detection sys-
tem capable of detecting only cocaine would not constitute a search anywhere in
the United States because cocaine is contraband throughout the Union. In con-
124 Place, 462 U.S. at 703-04.
125 Id. at 707.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001). "[Slense-enhancing equipment that identi-
fies nothing but illegal activity is not a search." Id. at 47-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
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trast to the uniform illegality of cocaine possession throughout the United
States, the legality of carrying concealed weapons varies among the fifty
states.' 30 Currently, it is legal to carry concealed firearms, provided the appro-
priate state permits are obtained, in thirty-one states. Assuming that a weapon
detection system could be developed that detects the presence only of fire-
arms, 132 random scans with the system could be used only in the nineteen states
where possession of concealed firearms is illegal. Probable cause or reasonable
articulable suspicion would be needed to scan suspects with the detection sys-
tem in the thirty-one states where it is legal to carry concealed firearms. 1
33
The Fourth Amendment would not proscribe the use of weapon detec-
tion systems revealing the presence only of contraband. However, weapon de-
tection systems capable of detecting only contraband do not currently exist. The
weapon detection systems that have recently become available (e.g., Body
Search low dose X-ray imager) or are currently under development (e.g., Mil-
livision millimeter wave imager) have the greatest potential for more effective
weapon detection - but also are highly intrusive.
Because weapon detection systems that are currently available reveal
the presence of items other than contraband, they cannot be categorized as di-
chotomous search systems like the canine sniff discussed in Place. Until di-
chotomous weapon detection systems are developed, weapon detectors can not
be used to scan individuals in non-administrative settings where the police do
not have probable cause that the individual has committed a crime or a reason-
able articulable suspicion that they are armed and dangerous.
130 Gun-Detection Devices Ripped As Too Intrusive, CHATTANOOGA FREE PRESS, Apr. 8, 1997,
at A3.
131 Id.
132 Metal detectors currently in use detect all metal items; detection is not limited to firearms.
The resolution of these systems is low. Although some companies, such as InVision Technolo-
gies, Inc., are developing passive magnetic sensing technology capable of recognizing the mag-
netic moments, or "signatures," of specific weapons, allowing the system to "discriminate be-
tween guns and harmless clutter objects such as keys and eye glasses," these systems are not cur-
rently available. InVision Technologies Subsidiary Accelerates Development of New Weapons
Detection Technology, Enters Technology Licensing Agreement, Bus. WIRE, Apr. 30, 1999,
LEXIS, News Library, Business Wire File.
133 This only applies to use of the weapon detection system in random "street" scans. This
caveat does not apply to use of the weapon detection system in an administrative search context.
For example, because concealed firearms are illegal in all commercial airports, the system could
be used to scan for concealed firearms in airports, even in the thirty-one states where concealed
firearm possession is legal.
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2. Administrative Searches: Vehicle Checkpoints, Border
Searches, Airports
a. Vehicle Checkpoints
Case precedent reveals that weapon detection systems could not be used
at vehicle checkpoints that were established primarily to detect ordinary crimi-
nal activity. 134 The use of vehicle checkpoints to detect criminal activity has
been a matter of intense debate.1 35 The Supreme Court has approved of the use
of suspicionless highway checkpoints for three objectives: (1) detecting illegal
aliens, 36 (2) inspecting each driver's license and vehicle registration, 137 and (3)
conducting sobriety tests.
38
In City of Indiana7polis v. Edmond,139 the Court recently considered the
constitutionality of the use of a drug-sniffing dog to detect contraband at a li-
cense and vehicle registration checkpoint. The Court held that use of the drug-
sniffing dog at the registration checkpoint violated the Fourth Amendment and
noted that vehicle checkpoints cannot be established to detect ordinary criminal
activity. 140
The Court's holding in Edmond clearly indicates that the Fourth
Amendment bars the use of high resolution, highly intrusive weapon detection
systems to randomly scan drivers at vehicle checkpoints.' 41 More importantly
however, the Court's holding in Edmond indicates that the Fourth Amendment
proscribes the use of dichotomous, high resolution, low intrusiveness weapon
detectors analogous to the canine sniff at vehicle checkpoints.
Although case precedent indicates that weapon detection systems could
not be used to detect ordinary criminal activity at vehicle checkpoints, the Court
noted in Edmond that "there are circumstances that may justify a law enforce-
ment checkpoint where the primary purpose would .. . .but for some emer-
134 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
135 See, e.g., Edmond, 531 U.S. 32; Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444
(1990); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
136 See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 562.
137 In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), the Supreme Court suggested that vehicle
checkpoints could be established to inspect the driver's license and registration as long as all
oncoming traffic was stopped and questioned. Subsequent to the Court's decision in Prouse,
lower courts have upheld general vehicle registration checkpoints as constitutional. See 4 WAYNE
R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 10.1-.02, at 676-78, 682-85 (3rd ed. 1996).
138 Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453-55.
139 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
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gency, relate to ordinary crime control."'' 42 In defining such a circumstance, the
Court stated that "the Fourth Amendment would almost certainly permit [a]...
roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack."'' 43 Based on the Court's
holding in Edmond, use of weapon detection systems at a vehicle checkpoint
may be constitutionally permissible as long as the checkpoint is an "appropri-
ately tailored roadblock" established based on probable cause to believe that a
terrorist attack is imminent and that establishment of the checkpoint will aid in
thwarting the attack.144
b. Border Searches
The Court's holding in United States v. Ramsey145 indicates that Fourth
Amendment protection virtually disappears at international borders. People may
be stopped and searched at international borders without a warrant. In addition,
border patrol agents may search individuals crossing international borders with-
out probable cause to believe the individual has committed a crime and without
reasonable articulable suspicion that the individual is armed and dangerous. 46
No "individualized suspicion of wrongdoing" is required for searches or sei-
zures conducted at international borders.
147
High-resolution, highly intrusive weapon detection systems could be
employed at international borders and could be used to randomly scan individu-
als entering the country. No individualized suspicion of wrongdoing would be
required to conduct border searches with existing weapon detection systems or
systems currently under development.
c. Airports
Airports, like international borders, present unique situations with re-
gard to the Fourth Amendment. In Florida v. J.L.,48 the Supreme Court noted
that it did not hold "that public safety officials in quarters where the reasonable
expectation of Fourth Amendment Privacy is diminished, such as airports ...,
cannot conduct protective searches on the basis of information insufficient to
justify searches elsewhere." In addition, in Ramsey, the Court clearly indicated
that the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment that applied at international bor-
142 Id. at 44.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 431 U.S. 606 (1977).
146 Id. at 616.
147 DRESSLER, supra note 97, at 283.
148 529 U.S. 266, 274 (2000) (internal citations omitted).
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ders, also applied at "functional equivalents" of international borders. 149  The
Court noted that "border-search doctrine, suggests no distinction... stemming
from the mode of transportation across [the] borders" of the United States. 150
The Court's holdings in J.L. and Ramsey suggest that airports where in-
ternational flights arrive will be treated as borders with respect to search and
seizure doctrine. Under this analysis, if necessary, passengers at airports could
be scanned with high resolution, highly intrusive weapon detection systems cur-
rently available.
V. CONCLUSION
The National Institute of Justice says that Millivision scanners "are in-
tended to be used only in places such as airports, courts and prisons or to search
suspects who may be frisked under Terry standards.' 151 Based on analysis of
case precedent, this may overstate the constitutionally permissible use of high
resolution, highly intrusive weapon detection systems like Millivision scanners.
Case precedent clearly indicates that high resolution, highly intrusive
weapon detection systems could be used to search suspects in all circumstances
where the police have probable cause to conduct a search and in all circum-
stances where a manual frisk would be permitted (e.g., search incident to arrest).
The use of weapon detection systems in these circumstances may reduce the risk
of injury both to police officers and to suspects. In addition, because the use of
a weapon detector does not require the suspect to stand "spread eagle" with his
hands on his head, weapon detectors can reduce the humiliation and anxiety
associated with being frisked in public.
Although newly developed weapon detectors may be substituted for
frisks in circumstances where a manual frisk would be appropriate, the high
level of intrusion associated with the use of these types of scanners makes it
unlikely that the Supreme Court would permit police to use them in place of
ordinary Terry-frisks. In recent decisions regarding search and seizure, the Su-
preme Court left itself room to create a "terrorist exception." Under the "terror-
ist exception," police would be permitted to use high resolution, highly intrusive
weapon detection systems in Terry-frisk circumstances. However, in order for
the search to fall under the "terrorist exception," the police must have a reason-
able articulable suspicion that the suspect is armed, dangerous, and involved in
terrorist activity.
Without probable cause to search or a reasonable articulable suspicion
that a suspect is armed and dangerous, high resolution, highly intrusive weapon
detectors can be used only in administrative searches. The Court's holding in
Place suggests that if a dichotomous weapon detection system could be devel-
149 431 U.S. at 622.
150 Id.
151 Milstone, supra note 17, at 32.
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oped that would detect only contraband, individualized suspicion would not be
required for its use. Although the Court's recent holding in Edmond makes this
conclusion less certain, it is clear that as a weapon detection system's resolution
increases, intrusiveness decreases, and the violence associated with the type of
criminal activity monitored increases, the Court will be less likely to determine
that use of the system violates the Fourth Amendment.
With regard to administrative searches, the Court's holding in Edmond
indicates that use of currently developed weapon detection systems in conjunc-
tion with roadblocks would constitute an impermissible search. In addition,
Edmond suggests that even if a perfectly dichotomous weapon detection system
were developed, its use at vehicle checkpoints may violate the Fourth Amend-
ment. However, use of even highly intrusive weapon detectors may be permit-
ted under circumstances where, in reaction to credible information indicating
terrorist activity is afoot, the police establish an appropriate roadblock tailored
to detect that activity.
Because of the reduction in Fourth Amendment protections at interna-
tional borders and airports, administrative searches at these locations can be
highly intrusive and can be conducted without individualized suspicion. Asso-
ciated with the sovereign's right to protect itself, high resolution, highly intru-
sive weapon detection systems can be employed at borders and in airports to
detect illegal activity.
Existing and development weapon detection systems have the potential
to work both good and evil. Because of the types of weapons currently em-
ployed by terrorists (e.g., plastic knives and shoes with the soles replaced by
explosives), it is impossible to imagine a weapon detection system capable of
detecting all instruments of death, while leaving personal items like artificial
limbs, colostomy bags, implants, and intimate items hidden from the govern-
ment eye. Use of current and developmental weapon detection systems offer the
promise of greater personal and national security and the simultaneous loss of
civil liberties. Unfortunately, the gain of one will inevitably mean some loss of
the other. The attacks of September 11 th demand that we re-balance civil liber-
ties with personal and national security. Although most of us hate change, the
re-balancing has already begun. It is only through knowledgeable consideration
and retrospection that we can recall the past, determine the civil liberties we are
willing to forego and the security we are willing sacrifice to protect our individ-
ual freedoms, and shape the future.
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APPENDIX
Low Medium High
Reliability of Data Forming Basis of Suspicion
Reliability of Data Forming Basis of Suspicion
Figure 1. Figure A illustrates the effect of the level of danger posed from a suspected
activity (i.e., terrorist activity v. carrying a switchblade) on the reliability of data needed
before a moderately invasive search can be conducted. The lower the level of danger
posed by the suspected activity, the higher the reliability of data required for a search of
a constant intensity. Figure B illustrates that by extrapolation, the Court's holding in
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000) indicates that for a constant level of reliability of
data, the level of search intensity permitted during a Terry frisk would increase with the
increasing level of danger posed by the suspected activity.
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